Mezzanine
Finance Can Be Critical Capital
Reprinted
with permission. Originally published in the November, 2002
edition of The Monitor industry newsletter
By
Marc A. Reich
Mezzanine
finance has long been a component in creating the optimal capital
structure for middle-market companies, but its importance has
increased dramatically within the last few years. Because underwriting
criteria applied by banks have tightened due to the softening
economy and pressure from bank regulators, demand for mezzanine
finance has increased significantly. In fact, mezzanine finance
is now often the difference between successfully bridging the
gap between equity and senior debt funding and having a deal
fail to close. This article is intended to provide the ownership
and management of companies, and their bankers, attorneys and
other professionals with a working understanding of mezzanine
finance and how it is applied in meeting the financing needs
of middle-market companies.
Mezzanine
finance occupies a location on the balance sheet of a company
between senior debt and equity.
Like the architectural
feature from which it derives its name, it sits above the main
floor of equity capital and below the upper floors consisting
of senior debt. Like most mezzanine floors, it is smaller than
the floors above and below it; thus, the dollar amount of mezzanine
finance is generally less than either the equity base or senior
debt of a company. Mezzanine finance can be viewed as a hybrid
form of capital, combining elements of both debt and equity.
It most commonly takes the form of subordinated debt coupled
with warrants that enable the investor to purchase shares in
a company at a predetermined price. Mezzanine finance is not
a control investment and is normally not used to take an ownership
position in a company.
The
subordinated debt, or “sub debt,” has all the
characteristics of other debt instruments, but is structurally
junior in priority of payment and its claim on collateral
to senior debt. Because of this subordinate position, sub debt
presents
a greater risk profile to the lender; and thus, warrants
a higher rate of return. The total internal rate of return,
or IRR, that
a mezzanine investor would seek in a mezzanine investment
in a privately held middle market company ranges from the high-teens
to the mid-20s. In today’s market, subordinated debt
for a middle market company typically has an interest rate
of between
10 and 12 percent, payable on a current basis. It is the
current-pay aspect of mezzanine finance that makes it generally
unavailable
to early-stage companies that are typically cash constrained,
preferring to use cash in their business rather than to service
debt. The sub debt would typically have a maturity ranging
from five to seven years, call for modest amortization over
its term,
and have a large balloon payment at maturity. The remainder
of the expected return over and above the interest rate charged
on the sub debt must come from the equity-linked aspect of
the
mezzanine investment, most often in the form of warrants.
The
warrant position that accompanies the subordinated debt is
known as the “equity kicker” and is structured
to provide another 10 to 12 percent of IRR to the investor.
Unlike
the debt component, this portion of the total return to
investors does not come in the form of periodic payments of
interest, but
through the projected increase in the equity value of a
company. The company is valued at the inception of the transaction
and
the warrants carry a price based upon this initial valuation.
It is important to note that the intent of the equity kicker
is to enable the mezzanine investor to achieve its targeted
return on the investment, not to take an ownership position
in the company.
The equity-related portion of the total return on the investment
is realized by the investor selling the warrants upon an “exit
event” or “put back” to the company at
some agreed upon date based upon a formula established
at the initial
closing of the deal. Some typical exit events are a sale
or change in control of the company or a recapitalization.
A
mezzanine investment is typically made in a company that is
facing some sort of growth opportunity, e.g., the
acquisition of another company, the acquisition of the
company itself
by new management, the establishment of a new product
line or
distribution
channel or merely internal growth. This growth opportunity
is expected to create top line revenue growth, bottom
line growth
in earnings, and most importantly, increased cash flow;
which ultimately, increases the value of the company.
The resulting
increase in equity value translates into an increase
in value of the warrants. Mezzanine capital is most commonly
used
in situations where the equity component of a company’s
capital structure is insufficient to satisfy senior lenders.
Senior lenders seek
to have a sufficient amount of capital subordinate to
them, normally in the form of equity or mezzanine, to
shield them from loss
of any of the capital they lend to a company. Senior
lenders, typically banks and finance companies, are generally
indifferent
to the form of the subordinate capital below them in
the capital structure, provided it will be there beyond
the term of their
loan, not place undue demands on the cash flow of the
company, and not possess rights greater than theirs.
This lender indifference makes mezzanine finance attractive
to companies since the all-in cost of mezzanine is considerably
lower than the 35 to 45 percent required by equity investors,
causing mezzanine to look like “cheap equity” to
a company, thus a cost effective alternative. Furthermore, mezzanine
finance, since it is primarily debt with only enough warrants
to enhance the overall yield to an acceptable level, is less
dilutive, requiring the owners to give up less of the company
than an equivalent amount of pure equity would require. The primary
measure utilized by investors and lenders in all levels of a
company’s capital structure to both determine the value
of the company and the amount they are willing to invest/lend
is cash flow analysis. Cash flow is normally measured on the
basis of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization,
or EBITDA. Generally, various multiples are applied to a company’s
EBITDA to determine the enterprise value of the company (normally
ranging from 4x to 6x) and how much senior debt a bank will lend
to the company (normally 2.0x to 2.5x, depending upon the company’s
underlying asset coverage). In today’s investment environment,
the average company is being valued at an EBITDA multiple of
4.0x to 5.0x. With the banks lending at 2.0x EBITDA (sometimes
a bit more, provided there is strong collateral coverage) and
sub debt lenders generally providing another 1.0x to 1.5x turns
in EBITDA, companies are now required to have the equivalent
of 1.0x to 1.5x EBITDA in private equity.
As
the economy, a company’s industry, and the performance
of the company ebbs and flows, the current market-level
multiples for that company may vary. A stronger overall situation
commands
higher multiples, while lower multiples prevail in
down or uncertain times as we are now experiencing. Prior to
2001, as banks were
pushed by competitive pressures to lend at higher multiples
of EBITDA, they were effectively becoming mezzanine investors
by
assuming higher levels of risk while receiving little
or no additional yield for that risk. Two years ago, deals
were routinely done
at valuation multiples of as much as 6x (sometimes
even higher), with banks lending 3.5x or more, much of it done
without asset
coverage, i.e. “air ball” financing. Thus
with senior lenders providing an additional l.0x to
1.5x of “air ball” financing
together with mezzanine lenders providing another l.0x
to 1.5x in funding, it was common to see minimal equity
levels of 1x
EBITDA or less. Those transactions resulted in the
high volume of highly leveraged transactions, HLTs,
presently in bank portfolios.
Many of those HLTs are now seeking additional equity
and/or mezzanine finance to strengthen their overall
capital structure, often
at the insistence of their banks.
Whether
used in conjunction with a management buyout, overall recapitalization
or as a stand alone transaction,
mezzanine
finance serves a vital purpose in crafting the capital
structure of a
company. It is the least expensive form of junior
capital, normally the least intrusive into the management
of
a company, and is
the least dilutive. With banks lending fewer dollars
to companies on an EBITDA multiple basis and purchase/valuation
multiples
having declined under the current economic conditions,
the demand for mezzanine has increased significantly.
While
the
current-pay
requirement of the debt component of mezzanine finance
makes it unattractive to and generally unattainable
for early stage
companies, it is an achievable and attractive alternative
to equity for latter stage companies with positive
cash flow.

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